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Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered 
structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory 
and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a 
variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their 
justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion 
with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by 
appeal to commonsense value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social 
roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate 
a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of 
reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from 





Conflicts between reasons are resolved through various kinds of defeat. Joseph Raz (1986; 
1999) proposed a new kind of defeat in order to explain a variety of apparently disparate 
phenomena, presenting a more nuanced picture of practical reason. Rather than outweighing 
or undercutting, sometimes one reason excludes another. This paper concerns what exactly 
it means for one reason to exclude another and how this contrasts with other kinds of defeat.  
 Reasons that can exclude others are central to Raz’s accounts of, inter alia, authority, 
decisions, and rules. The role of exclusion in commands has received the most attention, 
often in the form of Raz’s combinatory concept of a preemptive reason and in the context of 
his influential service conception of authority. From the outset, the coherence and usefulness 
of exclusionary reasons has faced serious objections (Clarke 1977; Gans 1986; Moore 1988; 
Perry 1988; Alexander 1990; Hurd 1991; Schauer 1991; Edmundson 1993). Raz responded 
to some initial criticisms but has largely moved on. New concerns consistently arise (Mian 
2002; Darwall 2010; Essert 2012), most recently from Whiting (2017) and Gur (2018). 
Buchanan (2011, 7) concludes that “no one has yet succeeded” in providing “a plausible 
account of exclusionary reasons.” 
 Despite these concerns, theorists continue to employ exclusionary reasons to explain 
increasingly varied phenomena. This is especially true of legal theory (e.g. Warner 1995; 
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Sunstein 2016) but is also common elsewhere (e.g. Ferrero 2010; Henning 2011; Tuomela 
2012; Stilz 2013; Keren 2014). Herstein (2017) concludes that exclusionary permissions are 
central to his notion of standing by analyzing tu quoque and related practices, and Martin 
(forthcoming) distinguishes distinct categories of obligations according to types of 
exclusionary reason. Additionally, many people who work on authority or law employ Raz’s 
conceptual analysis even when contesting his conception. For example, Darwall (2010, 261) 
accepts that creating exclusionary reasons “is a mark of practical authority.”  
 My aim in this paper is to provide a novel account of exclusionary defeat according to 
which exclusion is a matter of justification. Raz recognizes the possibility of such a 
justificatory account and explicitly rejects it in favor of a motivational account. So my 
purpose here is not to defend Raz or to engage in deep exegesis of his view. I also don’t aim 
to defend the use of exclusionary reasons in analyzing any specific phenomenon like 
commands or rules. Such concerns are downstream from our understanding of the nature of 
exclusionary reasons and more fundamentally exclusionary defeat. My focus is on whether 
we can give a coherent and compelling account of exclusionary defeat.  
 Here’s the plan. In Section 2, I explain Raz’s account and what I take to be its main 
problems, clearing the space for an alternative. In Section 3, I propose an alternative.  I begin 
by redefining second-order reasons and then I articulate a notion of exclusionary defeat that 
focuses on how reasons can be disqualified from bearing on acts. In Section 4, I explain why 
we should expect normative force to be subject to exclusionary defeat in this way, especially 
in the case of morality. I address two lingering concerns and conclude in Section 5. 
 
2 Raz’s account 
 
Following Raz, my focus in this paper is on practical rather than theoretical reasons. A 
practical reason (R) is a fact (F) that stands in the counting relation to some object (O) for 
some agent (A).1 A positive reason counts in favor of or supports the object; a negative reason 
counts against or elides the object. We determine what we ought to do in a fundamental 
sense by accounting for the reasons that bear on an act and resolving conflicts between them 
via various notions of defeat. We ought to act in whatever way the remaining undefeated 
reasons support. 
 Exclusionary reasons are negative second-order reasons. Raz distinguishes between 
first- and second-order practical reasons by distinguishing two different kinds of objects. 
First order reasons have some act (ϕ) as their object while second-order reasons have 
acting-for-a-particular-reason as their object. Raz (1999, 39) defines second-order reasons 
as “any reason to act for a reason or to refrain for acting for a reason.” An example is the case 
of Colin, who promises his wife to make decisions about their son’s education based only on 
                                                        
1 Although we sometimes we refer to a fact as the same reason across cases because it can be in more than one 
reason, I will avoid this; the reason is the relation between the fact, object, and agent, not the fact alone.  
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their son’s interests (Raz 1999, 39). The promise excludes any other grounds that would 
otherwise be relevant for this decision, such as concerns of cost, broader social justice, or 
what the neighbors might think. Colin can only send his son to a school for the reason that it 
would be best for his son. 
Key to Raz’s account is the idea that second-order reasons operate on a different 
normative level than first-order reasons. Imagine that the balance of all first-order reasons 
supports sending Colin’s son to public school, so in one important sense Colin ought to send 
his son to public school. The promise as a second-order reason introduces a new and distinct 
sense of ought (Raz 1999, 41-45). If Colin’s son’s interests support private school, then once 
the promise excludes all the reasons that are not about the son’s interests, Colin ought to 
send his son to private school. The second-order ought is what Colin ought to do all-things-
considered but the first-order ought does not go away (Raz 1999, 44). For Raz, the excluded 
reasons still determine what Colin ought to do in another sense and we often care about that 
sense, which leads to a telling feature of the presence of exclusionary reasons: regret.  
Consider a judge applying a minimum sentence where specifics of the defendant’s 
case would support greater leniency and so the judge regrets the sentencing. On Raz’s 
account, rules are exclusionary reasons. The judge ought to do what the sentencing rule says 
but the excluded first-order reasons support leniency, which is why the judge feels 
conflicted. There is a sense in which the judge ought to sentence the defendant to a harsh 
term and there is a sense in which the judge ought to be lenient.2  
These cases illustrate the central tension that Raz posited exclusionary defeat to 
explain but also remains mysterious for many. In a paradigmatic case, the judge would 
decide by weighing the reasons for and against the options. But this is not how the judge 
reasons in this case; the rule oddly intervenes in the process and makes the reasons to be 
lenient in some sense irrelevant. This is what explains the judge feeling bound to sentence 
harshly. At the same time, the leniency reasons are clearly not irrelevant, which is why they 
can ground regret and another sense of what the judge ought to do. This is not the 
stereotypical balancing kind of practical reasoning yet it is also coherent and indeed common 
(Scanlon 1998, 50-55). To my mind, the whole point of positing exclusionary defeat is to 
explain such cases. The main challenge for any account of exclusionary reasons is giving a 
coherent account of how and why reasons operate in this manner.  
Raz’s explanation relies on his notion of acting-for-a-reason, which defines second-
order reasons. Acting for a reason is about how the agent is motivated when she acts. 
Exclusionary reasons are “reasons for not being motivated in one’s action by certain (valid) 
considerations” (Raz 1999, 185). For example, Colin’s promise excludes Colin being 
motivated by concerns of social justice when deciding where to send his son to school. It 
defeats concerns of social justice as motivating reasons. It does not defeat them as normative 
                                                        
2 Strikingly, Raz (1999, 186) notes that it would be lucky if the agent tried what she ought to do in the second-
order sense and failed such that she did what she ought to do in the first-order sense. 
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reasons. Since it does not concern their normative or justificatory character, they are not 
defeated based on weight, which is a normative matter. The remainder exists because they 
are still normative reasons for us and can justify regret, blame, and other responses.  
For Raz, exclusionary reasons capture the tiered nature of practical reason. We often 
first face the higher-order decision about the manner in which we should make our first-
order decisions; only then do we face the first-order question of which option to take. The 
higher-order decision often does some agenda-setting work, determining which options are 
available at the first-order level. In Raz’s influential analysis of authority, for example, we 
recognize at the higher-order level that we should use whatever decision procedure is most 
likely to choose well because the issues at stake are of such importance.3 Thus, someone has 
authority when they fulfill the normal justification thesis: when obeying them is more likely 
to secure conformity with our underlying reasons than following our own judgment is.4  
Raz’s account faces three kinds of objections. The first has to do with whether an 
exclusionary account of some particular phenomenon works, such as authority or law, which 
I’ve set aside here. The second has to do with whether we can tell a coherent story about 
justification, defeat, and the structure of reasons that captures exclusion. This is the main 
concern that my new account is intended to address and so, both directly and indirectly, is 
the subject of the remainder of the paper. The third specifically concerns the motivating 
character of second-order reasons. These apply uniquely to Raz’s account and to my mind 
are also decisive against it. 
First, Raz seems to change the subject by introducing motivating reasons into issues 
that are better understood at the level of normative reasons.5 For example, appeal to 
motivating reasons seems to misconstrue the nature of promises. If I promise to pick you up 
at the airport, I take myself to be acting at the level of justification: I now have an obligation 
to pick you up. My promise is not about what motivations I should have when I pick you up. 
The idea that promises and all other exclusionary reasons are about how we should be 
motivated is at best odd.  
Second, insofar as the motivating move makes sense, it seems to be derivative of a 
change in normative reasons. We can sympathize with Colin feeling the force of his son’s 
interests but that invites the inquiry whether he should feel that way; if he literally cannot 
recognize anyone else’s interests, that’s problematic precisely because others’ interests 
matter as well. If Colin came to believe that he was only justified in sending his son to private 
school, then it might make sense to strategically reason about which motivations he needs 
to manipulate to ensure that outcome. But such reasoning about his motivations only makes 
                                                        
3 When issues aren’t so important, the independence condition is met and it is more important for us to decide 
for ourselves than it is to choose correctly (Raz 1986, 69). 
4 This misses some important features of the relationship between authority and subject and the sort of 
deference that authorities demand (Adams 2018).  
5 Thanks to a reviewer for pushing me to clarify this. 
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sense because he has determined how he ought to act and is concerned that he will not so 
act, perhaps due to weakness of will. When motivating reasons are relevant, it is because of 
their relation to the underlying normative reasons.6  
For example, Raz (2006, 1022) argues that commands exclude all those motivations 
that would lead the agent to act in a contradictory way. The agent can act on any motivation 
that would lead her to ϕ but this makes the focus on motivation merely strategic: the agent 
should ϕ regardless of what motivation leads her to ϕ and should not ϕ regardless of what 
motivation would lead her to not ϕ. The motivations are being classified by what outcome 
they produce. This is only sensible if this is the justified outcome.  
Third, most importantly and echoing Ross’s (2002, 5) criticism of Kant, we cannot 
have a reason to act-for-a-reason because acting-for-a-reason is not something we can 
choose to do.7 Moore (1988, 878) raised an early form of this objection; as Whiting (2017, 
404) nicely puts it, “In general you can do something for a reason but you cannot do 
something for a reason for a reason.” Yet that is what Raz’s account demands. Colin is 
supposed to choose to send his son to private school because it is in his son’s interests 
because he promised only to act on his son’s interests. Motivations do not seem to be under 
our control in the way required by Raz’s account. 
 
3 Exclusionary defeat 
 
An important and widely known feature of the United States’ legal system is the exclusionary 
rule. This rule governs whether certain evidence can be used in a criminal trial. If evidence 
is gathered in violation of a defendant’s rights, for example, then the rule excludes that 
evidence. That evidence cannot be presented to the jury and, if it has already been, the jury 
is instructed to ignore it. The exclusionary rule defeats the evidence in an odd way. It doesn’t 
give us better evidence that the defendant is innocent, nor does it show that the evidence is 
unreliable. Instead, it disqualifies the evidence, removing it entirely from the process. 
Exclusionary reasons analogously disqualify their target reasons. In this section, I offer a new 
explanation of this exclusionary effect. 
On my account, exclusionary reasons are negative second-order reasons, but I 
understand second-order reasons differently. Very simply, a second-order practical reason 
takes another reason as its object. It bears directly on another normative reason rather than 
on an act, as in Raz’s account (where the act is act-for-some-reason).8 In other words, a 
second-order reason is a fact that bears on whether and how another fact counts. For 
                                                        
6 The strongest cases against this, for example wanting a partner to help because they want to not because they 
are required to, seem to me to be better described as reasons to develop a certain character or virtue. 
7 Thanks to a reviewer for pointing out this parallel.  
8 I’ve purposely defined second-order practical reasons in such a way as to avoid needing to posit third- and 
higher-order reasons. Any reason which bears on another reason rather than directly on an act is second-order, 
even if it bears on another second-order reason. The ‘directly’ qualifier is necessary because a first-order 
reason could have an act that merely involves reasons in its object (Whiting 2017, 402). 
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example, the fact (F2) that the defendant’s confession was obtained illegally counts against 
the fact (F1) that the defendant confessed counting when determining guilt (ϕ). When R2 
excludes R1, R1 no longer counts in the way it purports to.  
Understood in this way, exclusion is clearly a matter of normative reasons and 
justification. When a reason is excluded, it no longer counts. This avoids the concerns that 
come with appealing to motivating reasons but also causes its own problems. A main 
problem is that this characterization appears to muddle the distinction between exclusion 
and undercutting (or what is also called cancelling). On my account, undercutting reasons 
are also second-order reasons. Yet there is no point to positing exclusion if it is the same as 
undercutting since exclusion will not be able to do any distinct explanatory work. The 
remainder of this section is devoted to distinguishing exclusionary defeat. The second main 
problem is whether we can plausibly explain how normative reasons can have this 
exclusionary effect. Articulating that problem and addressing it is the task of the final two 
sections. 
Reasons defeat is best understood through the lens of reasons conflict. Direct conflict 
between reasons occurs when both bear on the same object.9 Both first-order and second-
order reasons can come into direct conflict with reasons at their own level. Direct conflict 
between first-order reasons occurs when both reasons bear on the same ϕ, as when R1 
supports ϕing and R2 supports not ϕing. Often this is because R2 supports ψing such that ϕ 
and ψ cannot both be performed. Direct conflict between second-order reasons occurs when 
both a positive and negative second-order reason bear on the same reason: the former 
counts in favor of it counting, the latter counts against it counting. Direct conflicts of either 
sort are settled by comparing weight or strength; R1 defeats R2 by outweighing it.10 
Indirect conflict between reasons occurs when one reason (R2) bears on another 
reason (R1) in such a way as to undermine it. By definition, then, all and only negative 
second-order reasons cause indirect conflict. Considered on its own, R1 has no defense 
against R2, so R2 defeats R1. When R2 completely elides R1, R1 no longer supports ϕing, so 
A’s actions would be determined by the balance of reasons independent of R1.11 But there 
may be R3 relevant to R1 that indirectly or directly conflicts with R2, an R4 that conflicts 
with R3, and so on. We only know whether R1 supports ϕing in this context once all the 
higher-order conflicts that bear on it have been resolved. Since higher-order conflicts bear 
on whether a reason counts when ϕing, all higher-order conflicts must be resolved before 
direct conflicts; first-order direct conflicts of the paradigmatic sort are the last step in 
determining the balance of reasons. 
                                                        
9 Raz (1999, 25) defines reasons conflict to constrain it to direct conflict.  
10 At the second-order level, though, weight may resolve conflicts between exclusionary and inclusionary 
reasons but not conflicts between exclusionary and intensifying reasons. 
11 Indirect defeat can come in degrees such that the defeated reason gives less support to its object than it 
otherwise would but still gives some support. I think this is true of both undercutting and exclusion (consider 
mechanical weighting procedures). But it will be easier to discuss the issues in more absolute terms, so I’ll focus 
on complete elision.  
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The important point for us is that there are different kinds of indirect conflict and so 
different kinds of indirect defeat. Indirect conflict attacks a reason’s status qua reason: it 
attacks the counting relation between fact and object. The higher-order reason (R2) consists 
of a fact (F2) bearing on another reason (R1/O2), which itself consists in a fact (F1) bearing 
on an object (O1). We can taxonomize types of indirect defeat according to how F2 bears on 
R1: it is a fact about F1 or ϕ? These correspond respectively to undercutting and 
exclusionary defeat.12 R2 undercuts R1 when it identifies a feature of F1 that explains why 
F1 does not count when ϕing. R2 excludes R1 when it identifies a feature of ϕ that explains 
why F1 does not count when ϕing.  
Put another way, facts about the context of choice can undercut while facts about the 
choice itself can exclude.13 A reason is undercut when it doesn’t count in these 
circumstances; a reason is excluded when it doesn’t count for this kind of choice. Both 
undercutting and exclusion thus depend on the idea that in a different context, the target 
reason (R1) counted or would have counted. Then something changes or another reason is 
brought to bear such that the target reason no longer counts in the same way. We can 
understand this idea of change in different ways, for example temporally, modally, or as a 
matter of prima facie and pro tanto reasons. I think all can be relevant but don’t have the 
space to pursue this in detail. What’s important is that undercutting and exclusion differ 
based on what part of the target reason their fact is about. A reason is undercut when the 
context of choice, or the state of affairs, changes; a reason is excluded when the choice under 
consideration changes. (In the final section I attempt to address concerns about how clearly 
this distinction can be made.) 
Here’s a simple example of the contrast. Consider a normal hamburger and the 
reasons Kelly might have to eat it, for example its tastiness: the fact (F1) that the burger is 
tasty counts in favor of (ϕ) eating the burger. The fact (F2) that something rotten has been 
added to the burger undercuts R1: in essence, it renders the burger less tasty or not tasty. In 
contrast, the fact (F3) that Kelly is vegetarian excludes R1: the burger is still tasty but 
tastiness has been disqualified as grounds for choosing whether to eat the burger. We can’t 
make it the case that Kelly ought to eat the burger by making it tastier or by making the 
tastiness reasons weightier; Kelly’s vegetarianism defeats the tastiness reasons but not as a 
matter of weight. Kelly’s choice regarding the burger is determined by their commitments, 
disqualifying some kinds of considerations from mattering. R2 is an undercutting reason 
because F2 is about the burger; R3 is an exclusionary reason because F3 is about the sort of 
choice Kelly is trying to make.  
 This example includes what I take to be three important features of exclusionary 
defeat. They are what I term choice sensitivity, narrow scope, and limitation.14 First, 
                                                        
12 So exclusion is not undercutting, contra, e.g., Levy (2015, 367).  
13 Thanks to two reviewers for pushing me to clarify this.  
14 Raz (1986, 42, 46, 61) discusses similar issues. As a reviewer rightly noted, a fuller account of exclusionary 
reasons requires further detailed explanation of these features. 
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explaining the defeat of the tastiness reasons is best explained by appeal to the choice itself: 
for the choice to be vegetarian, it must disqualify reasons to consume like tastiness when the 
food is animal flesh. Second, because it is in the choice and not the state of affairs, the 
excluded reasons still count in various ways. Included in this is regret: because the burger 
really is still tasty, Kelly may regret not being able to eat it. But it includes other things as 
well. Kelly’s non-vegetarian companion may decide to eat the burger, unlike when the 
tastiness has been undercut by the rotten additions. Third, the tastiness reasons are only 
excluded insofar as Kelly’s vegetarian commitments hold. If Kelly is starving or is being 
forced to eat something with animal flesh, then they may choose to eat the burger precisely 
because it is the tastiest option available. Exclusionary defeat has these features precisely 
because it concerns facts about the choice being made, in contrast to undercutting. Making 
the same kind of choice will give exclusionary reasons even when circumstances change: 
Kelly also ought not eat the hot dog. When the tastiness reasons are undercut, they cannot 
support any act that relied on tastiness but when they are excluded, they can support other 
choices that don’t have the same character. 
 This understanding of exclusionary defeat closely mirrors some features of Scanlon’s 
discussion of the complex structure of reasons. His discussion raises various issues of 
cancelling, enabling, and exclusion. What I call exclusion he discusses as “bracketing… 
reason-giving force” (Scanlon 1998, 52). Not only is such bracketing possible, “Much of our 
practical thinking is concerned with figuring out which considerations are relevant” (Scanlon 
1998, 53). Further, bracketing demonstrates the three features of exclusion noted above. 
When bracketing a friend’s feelings during a tennis match, “My concern for his feelings is not 
eliminated or even diminished; I just judge them not to be relevant to certain decisions” 
(Scanlon 1998, 52). Relevance is determined by the nature of a narrowly defined choice: his 
friend’s feelings are irrelevant to whether he should try to hit a winning shot but still relevant 
to collegiality in the game. 
 In the rest of this section, I explain further cases of exclusionary defeat to demonstrate 
the scope of the phenomenon as well as some important differences among cases. This is 
meant to motivate a general and ecumenical commitment to exclusionary defeat at a 
descriptive level. The phenomenon is so widespread that denying the coherence of exclusion 
as a mode of reasons defeat is inadvisable. Instead, the concern is about explaining 
exclusionary defeat at the level of moral reasons and justification. That is the focus of the 
next section. 
We see exclusionary defeat at work in very different contexts. Most fundamentally, it 
appears that certain kinds of values and disvalues are constituted by their limitations or their 
inclusiveness.15 Autonomy requires that I have control over my life and you don’t (Raz 1999, 
199). Whether I am justified in ϕing or not does not depend on whether you have given me 
                                                        
15 Raz (1999, 183) raises the interesting example of ascetic reasons. 
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permission to ϕ: the exclusion of your judgment as determining whether I should act in some 
way is constitutive of my autonomy.16 If I can only ϕ when you give me permission to ϕ, I am 
subservient to you and this disrespects my autonomy, treats me paternalistically, makes me 
subordinate, and so on (Dempsey 2013, 20).  Such interference is wrong not because my 
judgment outweighs yours but because for my decision to be autonomous at all, your 
judgment must be excluded from determining whether I am permitted to ϕ. Autonomous 
decisions are autonomous just because some (otherwise apparently relevant) 
considerations are excluded from determining how the agent ought to act. 
Similarly, fairness requires identical treatment across relevant features and no 
differential treatment across irrelevant features. The exclusion of treatment on irrelevant 
features is partly constitutive of fairness; fair policies must exclude religion as the grounds 
for hiring public employees. To treat someone fairly, only relevant features can count; 
fairness gives exclusionary reasons that disqualify irrelevant features from counting to 
justify differential treatment.17 When I have reasons to respect someone’s autonomy or treat 
them fairly, I have some exclusionary reasons: deferring to another’s judgment or acting on 
irrelevant features would constitute disrespecting their autonomy or treating them unfairly. 
Again, exclusion is constitutive. The point isn’t that fairness outweighs differential treatment 
on irrelevant features; what it means to treat them fairly is to exclude irrelevant features. 
Fairness may then be balanced against other values but exclusion is part of what constitutes 
fair treatment. 
 Moving away from values themselves, some social practices only work because and 
when they include exclusionary reasons: given the purpose of the practice, including some 
considerations as the basis for some decisions would be self-defeating. Arbitration must 
exclude the parties’ personal judgment of the merits of the decision as grounds for 
conformity (Raz 1986, 41-42). Inclusion of these defeats the purpose of arbitration, which 
we use precisely when the parties’ personal judgments are at odds and can’t be resolved 
otherwise. Arbitration without exclusion is self-defeating. Given that exclusion has the three 
features of choice sensitivity, narrow scope, and limitation, this doesn’t mean that the parties 
ought to follow the arbitrator’s decision no matter what. Arbitration as a practice only makes 
sense under some conditions; the decision’s exclusionary power only holds within the 
bounds in which the practice itself holds. 
Many practices involve exclusionary reasons in less obvious ways. Scanlon (1998, 52) 
notes: 
Being a good teacher, or a good member of a search committee, or even a good 
guide to a person who has asked you for directions, all involve bracketing the 
reason-giving force of some of your own interests which might otherwise be 
quite relevant and legitimate reasons for acting in one way rather than 
                                                        
16 Dempsey (2013) and Herstein (2017) both argue that autonomy involves exclusionary permissions; in some 
circumstances, I get to choose whether to include or exclude your wishes or advice, for example.   
17 Thanks to a reviewer for noting the parallels to fairness in Rawls’ (1999, 118) veil of ignorance. 
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another. So the reasons we have for living up to the standards associated with 
such roles are reasons for reordering the reason-giving force of other 
considerations. 
Here the agent has taken up a role and the reasons she has for acting in that role exclude 
some considerations from her decision-making. It might feel good to assign grades based on 
one’s feelings towards students but, given the ideals and values in the role of the teacher, 
some kinds of considerations can’t count when assessing students. Those excluded reasons 
aren’t merely outweighed: increasing the weight of your feelings won’t justify moving the 
assessment just a little. 
Exclusion arises in the context of many kinds of personal relationships because it 
captures some elements of partiality. As Martin (forthcoming, 16) points out, being bored by 
ballet is relevant to whether to attend a professional performance but not your daughter’s. 
The relationship disqualifies boredom from counting and failing to attend because of 
boredom would be blameworthy. Similarly, if a friend is sick, mere inconvenience does not 
count against visiting them. Friendship is in part constituted by ignoring certain 
considerations in favor of the friend’s interests and precisely not weighing whether the 
friendship is worth the costs. Mere inconvenience is excluded as a reason not to care for your 
friends (Scanlon 1998, 54). 
Exclusionary reasons are also often relevant within the context of specific decisions. 
Returning to Colin, we can understand his promise to only decide about his son’s schooling 
based on his son’s interests: it represents a view of what is good about the choice or what 
sort of choice is being made.18 Vehement disagreement may arise about the character of the 
choice before even considering different outcomes. Similarly, parents might ask their child 
to make a choice about which university to attend without accounting for cost. They worry 
that including reasons of cost would skew the decision, based on a certain understanding of 
the kind of choice being made.  
Finally, exclusionary reasons are sometimes relevant because of circumstantial 
features of the choice situation (Raz 1999, 48). Unfortunately, many of Raz’s central 
examples are circumstantial or what Scanlon (2004, 41) calls purely pragmatic: they concern 
“the costs and effectiveness of the process of deliberation, rather than the substantive 
relevance of the reasons it instructs an agent to ignore.” Raz (1999, 37) discusses the case of 
Ann, who is offered a complex investment opportunity late at night and with a deadline of 
midnight. Ann has had a difficult day and is tired and upset.  Raz says that Ann’s weariness 
is an exclusionary reason for her to not attempt to make the investment decision at all. But 
her state has nothing to do with whether the investment is a good one, only with whether 
she can make a trustworthy decision about the investment in her current conditions, so how 
can it change her decision? 
                                                        
18 This is why Colin’s promise counts as exclusionary on my view: it changes the choice from ‘decide about 
schooling’ to ‘decide about schooling under the constraints set by the promise’, rather than changing any 
features of the school or other matters of the context. Thanks to a reviewer for raising this question. 
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Accounting for circumstantial exclusionary reasons helps clarify the feature of 
exclusion I termed choice sensitivity. The oddity comes from framing her choice as simply 
whether to invest or not. Her options, though, are invest-by-midnight or don’t invest. Her 
psychological state means that investing by midnight means investing based on an 
untrustworthy assessment. If we discovered some unprofitable feature of the investment, 
that feature would undercut the investment. A circumstantial exclusionary reason arises 
from identifying some feature of the situation in which the choice is being made. 
Ann’s case also illustrates the narrow scope and limitations of exclusion. If she could 
get her alert partner to assess the opportunity, or if she could rest before deciding, then she 
would have no exclusionary reason. Further, if the opportunity were not so complex or she 
were not quite so worn out, then the exclusionary reason may be overridden due to exclusion 
only working within certain closely-defined domains. The epistemology and pragmatics of 
how we encounter and manage exclusionary reasons are separate issues from how 
exclusionary defeat among reasons works, albeit difficult issues that sometimes muddle 
their operation in practice. 
Circumstantial exclusionary reasons should not be a central case since they are made 
relevant to the choice extrinsically. The other examples of exclusionary reasons cannot be 
dismissed just by changing the circumstances of choice because exclusion plays a more 
constitutive role in the practice, decision, or value in question: the exclusionary reason arises 
from an intrinsic feature of the choice in question. Raz’s focus on circumstantial cases, 
especially in making his case for his conception of authority, has misled subsequent 
discussion away from the more robust role that exclusion can play. 
Some decisions only take limited factors into account. Autonomous choices are not 
deferred to others’ directives; fair choices are not based on irrelevant features; good 
financial advice is not swayed by the advisor’s pecuniary interests; accounting for monetary 
cost can distort an educational decision. Exclusion captures the way that the character of the 
choice being made can limit the set of relevant factors. Excluded reasons no longer count in 
what the agent ought to do with respect to that particular choice. Exclusion is a matter of the 
normative force or justificatory power of a reason being disqualified. This contrasts with 
Raz’s account of exclusion as concerning motivating reasons.19 It avoids the criticisms that 




Moore (1988, 854ff) proposed and critiqued three interpretations of Raz’s account of 
exclusionary reasons: justificatory, motivating, and decision-procedure. In response, Raz 
                                                        
19 Note that accounts of particular phenomena that rely on Raz’s notion of exclusion will often be able to rely 
on my alternative without alteration, since many do not appeal specifically to motivating reasons. 
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(1988, 1156) defended the motivating interpretation and explicitly rejected the alternatives. 
Raz, Moore, and others have all offered arguments against justificatory exclusion. In this 
section I explain why it is plausible to think that reasons can be excluded as a matter of 
justification.20  
 The main problem is this: it seems implausible that reasons can lose their normative 
force in the way exclusion requires. For example, in addition to giving some positive reason 
to conform, legitimate laws are supposed to exclude considerations in favor of law-
breaking.21 Perhaps I am driving on the highway and see an animal suffering on the side of 
the road. The suffering gives me a reason to stop but it is illegal for me to pull over here. The 
law supposedly excludes the suffering but law can’t have this power! We can see how the law 
could outweigh the suffering, as when the suffering is outweighed by the risks of pulling over 
on a crowded highway. But when the suffering is outweighed, it still matters, it still has 
normative force. The suffering could be undercut if the animal dies. But the suffering can’t 
be disqualified: if suffering is intrinsically bad, as I am presuming, then it must constitute a 
pro tanto practical reason. Nothing can affect its normative force; certainly law or some rule 
can’t. As Moore (1988, 856) puts it, “We do not have anything like this kind of sovereignty 
over morality.”22 
 But we do. Accepting Moore’s basically realist approach, exclusion is at home in an 
understanding of morality where moral reasons are not always uniquely conclusive, do not 
simply agglomerate, and often involve trade-offs. On this picture of commonsense value 
pluralism (Scheffler 2004, 255), morality is a matter of value conflicts and losses, free 
choices, and complex relations. Exclusion is uncomfortable in, and unnecessary for, a picture 
of morality where values never need to be traded off, free choice is irrelevant, and moral 
reasons simply agglomerate. This is a picture of morality that a caricatured utilitarian could 
perhaps accept. But exclusion is indispensable for the more nuanced and, to my mind, more 
plausible view.  
We can see exclusion at work in three areas.23 First, morality is often indeterminate 
with respect to policies or laws and makes room for positive social practices to determine 
which moral reasons count and how within their jurisdiction. Second, social roles and, 
relatedly, organizations both rely on restricting which considerations count for participants 
when occupying the role or acting within the organization. Third, leading one’s own life 
involves making such choices (often among roles and organizations). 
First, morality is mostly indeterminate with respect to the precise details of public 
practices. An uncontroversial example is driving. The risks of driving mean that we must 
                                                        
20 This may also be a defense of what Perry (1988) calls “objective” exclusionary reasons, as opposed to Raz’s 
subjective account. 
21 This is what I take to be a standard approach to legitimate law, which I am assuming for this discussion. 
Thanks to a reviewer for pushing me to clarify this.  
22 Underlying this conviction may be the thought that every pro tanto practical reason counts for every decision. 
23 I take these to be generally sympathetic with Raz’s important work on values, pluralism, and practices. 
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coordinate around rules that substantially lower the risk, for example lowering the 
likelihood of head-on collisions by separating out directionally grouped lanes on the road. 
But our reasons to separate lanes do not tell us whether we should drive on the right hand-
side or the left-hand side: the moral reasons are indeterminate. We decide this by 
convention; once the decision is made, it determines that we are all obligated, within 
particular jurisdictions, to drive on one side or the other. In one place, the choice to drive on 
the left excludes our genuine pro tanto moral reasons for a policy for driving on the right 
while in another, the moral reasons to drive on the left are excluded by the community’s 
choice to drive on the right.24  
We might worry that this case is too limited, perhaps thinking that this indeterminacy 
is only present in mala prohibita cases, or that there are no genuine moral reasons in such 
cases. But all judiciable legal rules must be much more complex than what morality 
determines. Just like with traffic regulations, you can make a law against murder so poorly 
that it is unjustified, for example if it allows exceptions of race or gender. But, for example, 
the Model Penal Code defines murder thusly (1962, §210.2): 
(1) Except as provided in 210.3(1)(b), criminal homicide constitutes murder when: 
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such 
recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged in or is an 
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing 
or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or 
threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious escape. 
The only way to understand this definition is to refer to many other parts of the code, 
including the definitions of other offenses and of mental states. Morality doesn’t completely 
determine each element, let alone the specific contents of the statute. 
This is not to deny that there are better and worse choices or that we can morally 
evaluate this rule. It is simply to say that there is no uniquely morally right definition of 
murder such that every jurisdiction must instantiate it and that if it doesn’t instantiate the 
definition in that way, it wrongs those over whom it imposes its rules. As long as you endorse 
indeterminacy of this weak sort, you have justificatory exclusion among moral reasons. By 
writing the statute one way, you prioritize a certain set of reasons and exclude others from 
counting. This represents a balance among conflicting values or reasons that is not uniquely 
determined by morality but left up to social settlement via institutions. 
The second case where morality clearly makes room for exclusion is at the level of 
social organizations and roles (Raz 1986, 58). Recall Scanlon’s example of being a teacher, 
which requires excluding some reasons of personal self-interest when making decisions 
regarding students. All roles within social practices define themselves by determining what 
considerations are relevant for role occupants. A role that failed to do this would allow each 
                                                        
24 Such reasons are not cancelled; sometimes we should conform to them, as in emergencies. 
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occupant to determine what their role requires and how to balance all considerations in 
every decision. In turn, this would lead to wild inconsistencies in how role occupants act and 
ultimately would undermine the practice’s ability to coordinate action and pursue its ends, 
i.e. to survive as a social practice at all. 
Relatedly, organizations are partly constituted by rules and roles, which determine 
which sorts of values they can pursue. In order to be a coherent practice through time, these 
rules and roles must be relatively settled and so represent a choice about which values will 
be pursued in what ways. Most organizations specialize and pursue specific goods according 
to their type, for example churches, businesses, or schools, and cannot pursue all goods 
simultaneously. The reasons to pursue other values or to pursue their values in other ways 
are excluded by the chosen settlement as represented by the current organizational form.  
Consider again the criminal trial. Criminal trials constitute and pursue many distinct 
values, some of which conflict. The core value is accuracy: we want trials to identify who 
committed some violation. But we know that trials should also be fair, respectful, follow rule 
of law, and much else. These will require some rules that reduce accuracy, as when probative 
evidence is excluded because it would be unfair to the defendant or would enable too much 
power on the part of the state (Ho 2016).  
My account explains this by appeal to the character of the decision being made. The 
determination of legal guilt at a criminal trial is grounds for the state to punish the defendant 
and so the decision involves much more than accuracy. It is simultaneously about pursuing 
justice for victims, the public officially determining the cause of and responsibility for a 
violation, the public condemning the violation, the state exercising its power and 
intentionally harming someone, respect for the defendant, and perhaps deterrence or 
retribution. Accounting for all these disparate elements is crucial to understanding the jury’s 
choice and thus which reasons should count towards that decision. 
Third, from the perspective of the individual, we most often make choices at this 
intermediate level of roles and about what sorts of considerations will be relevant. This is 
our personal moral autonomy at work: what kind of person we are is up to us. Scanlon (1998, 
53) argues that “Much of our practical thinking is concerned with figuring out which 
considerations are relevant to a given decision, that is to say, with interpreting, adjusting, 
and modifying this more general framework of principles of reasoning.” He gives the 
example of playing a round of golf. The reasons we have to golf depends on how we frame 
that choice: as a temporary amusement, a way to reconnect with friends, a lifelong pursuit, 
or career. We get to decide how golf matters in our life, which then determines the reasons 
we have to play this round. Morality does not demand that all or none of us play golf. 
Exclusionary reasons are thus best seen in combination with inclusionary reasons. 
These are not merely intensifying or enabling reasons (Dancy 2004): they are about which 
reasons should count in the first instance at all, what kind of considerations matter for the 
sort of choice being made. Parents might argue about whether they should take broader 
social justice concerns into account when deciding where to send their child to school. They 
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might later urge their child to consider proximity to ailing relatives when deciding where to 
go to university. These are all questions of which reasons are relevant to which sorts of 
choices, and this is often up to us. Although being a pro tanto reason may also be an 
inclusionary reason, sometimes there are defaults against including otherwise apparently 
relevant considerations (Ho 2016, 110) and such an inclusionary reason can be defeated. 
Utilitarians struggle with all these issues—the indeterminacy of rules, roles in social 
practices, and personal autonomy—precisely because they think moral reasons uniquely 
determine every choice. A utilitarian ignores what it means to be a friend because overall 
utility could demand sacrificing the friend or friendship on any occasion. But if there is space 
for conflict and decisions in morality, as commonsense holds there to be, then exclusion 
helps us explain how we make such choices. Various considerations are not cancelled; that 
would be too strong on any non-subjectivist account of moral normative force. Instead, 
within certain bounds, it is up to us individually or collectively to decide which 
considerations are relevant, bracketing off others, in order to make our choices have a 
certain character.  
 
5 Objections and conclusion 
 
To conclude I address two lingering issues facing my justificatory account of exclusion. First, 
the distinction between exclusion and undercutting may appear unstable. R2 undercuts R1 
when F2 is about F1 and R2 excludes R1 when F2 is about O1/ϕ. This presumes that we can 
define F1 and ϕ in a principled manner.25 The fact that the defendant confessed is a reason 
to find him guilty. That reason is undercut if we identify something about the confession that 
elides that connection, for example if the confession was faked. That reason is excluded if we 
identify something about our choice that elides that connection, for example that we want to 
decide fairly. But, the worry goes, both types of indirect defeat rely on features of both the 
confession and the decision. The reason is undercut because the confession is faked and we 
want our decision to be accurate. The reason is excluded because we want our decision to be 
fair and the confession was coerced. Kelly’s tastiness reasons are excluded because they are 
vegetarian and because the burger is made of meat. So my distinction fails. 
 It’s true that we can muddle undercutting and exclusion by switching between 
relevant descriptions of the cases but this is no surprise and also no theoretical hurdle. 
Choosing what description of an act is salient for decision-making and evaluation is central 
to moral judgment. Scanlon’s discussion emphasizes that often the difficult part of decision-
making occurs at this higher-order level, not at the level of balancing first-order reasons. 
                                                        
25 A reviewer helpfully observed that this bears similarities to the wrong kinds of reasons problems raised by 
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2004). My appeal to context is not fully specified here, serving merely to 
indicate how I take exclusionary reasons to work. This does make exclusionary reasons rather context- and 
often even preference-sensitive on my account, but I take it this is consistent with the commonsense pluralism 
and autonomy considerations above. 
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Children try to exploit different descriptions: “I’m not hitting, I’m just moving my arms and 
they got in the way.” The problem is not that different descriptions bring out different 
features of the case but deciding which description best captures the choice, related 
practices, the role and priority of the values involved, and so on. 
 In the case of the criminal trial, the first question is whether some fact is relevant to 
determining the truth of the matter; accuracy about who committed a violation is the 
primary value. This is why we can identify unfair trials, kangaroo courts, and so on as trials 
and courts; although they flout the further values that we place on trials, they take identifying 
a violator as their primary outcome. Confessions are relevant evidence because they can be 
a reliable indicator of who committed the crime. That is their first presentation. Then we 
recognize that in the context of publicly accusing someone of a violation, condemning them, 
inflicting hard treatment, and so on, accuracy cannot be our only guiding value. Fairness and 
respect enter the picture and can restrain what kinds of evidence we use—not only in terms 
of how evidence is gathered, but removing prejudicial evidence, making sure evidence is 
presented to peers, and so forth. Undercutting a confession involves showing that it cannot 
serve its essential evidential function; excluding it involves showing that our other values 
constrain us from using it as evidence although we would still like to.  
That’s why exclusion leaves a remainder that it will often make sense to account for 
in related practices. For example, sometimes excluded evidence is included if it is shown that 
it would have been discovered by legal means and sometimes evidence that is excluded for 
the purposes of a criminal trial that can be included in civil proceedings. In contrast, 
undercutting makes exclusion redundant; there’s no point in excluding a fake confession 
because it should already be taken out of the decision due to its lack of evidential value.  
We can see the core of the concern even here because an undercut confession is still 
a good reason in many ways, just not as a confession. It is good reason to ask how misleading 
evidence was used, for asking the defendant what happened, and so on. We have been 
considering undercutting and excluding the confession as grounds for the specific ϕ of a jury 
determining legal guilt. The same facts that constituted reasons for the jury with respect to 
that act can constitute different kinds of reasons, for different agents, for different ϕs.  
 We cannot identify whether a fact has the potential to undercut or exclude another 
reason without a fuller context about what decision that reason is for, including some stance 
on which values matter for that choice and in what order. Once that is settled, as in the trial 
case, then we can distinguish between undercutting and exclusion more clearly, although in 
a way that likely still requires judgment. This may be pragmatically difficult but it is not a 
reason to reject the distinction. 
 The final issue I address here concerns remainders and limitations. I argued above 
that commonsense morality makes space for decisions and practices that disqualify or 
exclude some considerations, and I gave many examples of such cases. But this might still 
seem like too much power; even if it’s true that our laws exclude some considerations, it can’t 
truly affect their normative force, as in the case of the animal suffering on the side of the road.  
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This has to do with the narrow scope of exclusionary defeat. The law disqualifies the 
dog’s suffering as the grounds for me to legally stop but the dog’s suffering still matters in a 
variety of ways. The fact that the dog is suffering arguably counts in favor of investigating 
whether I can exit safely and return, calling animal control, regretting my inability to help, 
advocating for more exceptions to traffic laws, and much else. The dog’s suffering is excluded 
from being a reason to break traffic law. But the dog’s suffering can matter in a variety of 
ways and still functions as a moral, practical reason. The main issue seems to be the law’s 
supposed claim to practical supremacy, not exclusion; but legality doesn’t always matter and 
the scope of the law’s exclusion only extends to instances where legality matters.  
This is why excluding and undercutting are so different. The ability to cancel a moral 
reason at whim would truly be surprising. Excluding is narrowly tailored to a particular 
choice in question and, as a moral matter, it may be the case that deciding to choose in a 
certain way and thereby exclude some consideration in fact requires compensatory acts 
elsewhere. Further, reasons that are excluded may under some conditions be so important 
that they ought to be conformed to. 
This helps us understand a classic concern, recently reframed by Gur (2018, 22). 
Military commands standardly exclude serious moral considerations such as civilian 
casualties: even if a particular subordinate believes that a mission is too risky to innocents, 
they are required to obey because of the exclusionary force of the command. But this 
explanation only goes so far. If the command is to commit a heinous act, then the very kind 
of reason that was excluded under standard conditions, i.e. balancing military objectives 
against killing innocents, seems to obviously justify disobedience. This is a puzzle: how can 
such reasons be both excluded and count? 
If exclusion was like canceling, then this would be impossible because whatever fact 
undercut the reason for the purposes of not counting for the subordinate would equally 
undercut the reason for the purposes of disobeying the command. But exclusion is about 
whether some fact counts for some act—under the right description. And “obey the 
command” and “commit a heinous act” are very different descriptions. We are aware that, 
for various reasons, we approach acts under different descriptions but can be mistaken 
about the most salient one, and so as good agents we are on the lookout for exceptions to our 
normal frameworks, especially under exceptional conditions like war. Subordinates are 
aware that sometimes they should just obey even when they disagree and sometimes they 
should reject a command; in modern militaries they are trained with just such a distinction, 
as they are made aware that they should not follow illegal orders.  
Here's a general explanation of this phenomenon. The presentation of an act under a 
certain description highlights its role in a broader social practice and the values that we 
pursue through that practice. An agent ought to do what an excluded reason favors just in 
those conditions where that reason is so strong that it outweighs making the choice under 
the auspices of the practice in question (not when it outweighs the value of having the 
practice at all). When it is more important to ϕ than be a good soldier, one ought to ϕ even 
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when ϕing is based on reasons that would normally be excluded in soldiering. Such is the 
case when ϕ is avoiding an atrocity. This is distinct from such excluded considerations 
always being weighed by the agent. The reasons being set against each other are not the 
normal first order reasons but include the higher-order reasons we have to engage in a 
practice of this sort. 
This sort of conflict is more complex but is also very familiar. As Raz describes them, 
they are relativized oughts: what I ought to do as a responsible person or what I ought to do 
as a soldier. More commonly, what I ought to do as a parent may come into conflict with what 
I ought to do as an employee. These cases are better described as conflicts between the 
oughts and roles because each is determined by a restricted set of considerations. The 
difficult reasoning, as Scanlon aptly describes it, is about balancing these different roles and 
sets of principles against each other rather than as a simple agglomeration of first-order 
reasons.  
In conclusion, we often have reasons to act on the basis of restricted considerations. 
The idea of exclusionary defeat helps us make sense of such choices. Exclusion presents a 
more complex but also more accurate picture of our practical reasoning. Unlike Raz’s original 
presentation which concerned motivation, exclusion should be understood as a justificatory 
matter which excludes normative reasons. An excluded reason does not count towards 
determining which option is justified for a choice of a specific type or with a certain 
character. This account of exclusionary reasons makes better sense of cases where exclusion 
appears in our practical reasoning, avoids the central problems with Raz’s motivational 
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